St. Mary's Law Journal
Volume 24

Number 2

Article 12

1-1-1993

Consent Decrees Resulting from Institutional-Reform Litigation
May Be Modified upon Showing a Significant Change in Law or
Fact and a Modification Appropriately Tailored to that Change.
Christy J. Lindsay

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, Immigration Law
Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, and
the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Christy J. Lindsay, Consent Decrees Resulting from Institutional-Reform Litigation May Be Modified upon
Showing a Significant Change in Law or Fact and a Modification Appropriately Tailored to that Change., 24
ST. MARY'S L.J. (1993).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol24/iss2/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Lindsay: Consent Decrees Resulting from Institutional-Reform Litigation Ma

JUDGMENTS-Consent Decrees--Consent Decrees
Resulting from Institutional-Reform Litigation May Be
Modified upon Showing a Significant Change In Law or
Fact and a Modification Appropriately Tailored to
that Change.
-

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,
U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1992).

In 1971, the inmates of Suffolk County Jail sued the local government for
confining them in unconstitutional living conditions.' Chief among their
complaints was the practice of double-bunking prisoners.2 After nine years
of litigation, the inmates obtained a consent decree requiring the government
to eliminate these malignant conditions through the construction of a new
facility with single-occupancy cells for detainees.' In 1989, Robert C. Rufo,
the Sheriff of Suffolk County, moved to modify the decree pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), 4 alleging that changes in facts and in
law required modification of the decree to allow double-bunking. 5 Sheriff
Rufo argued that a 1979 Supreme Court opinion6 which held that doublebunking was not per se unconstitutional constituted a change in law compel1. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 690 (D. Mass. 1973),
aff'd, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974). The unconstitutional conditions about which the inmates
complained included: double bunking, lack of privacy, inadequate diet and health care, structural inadequacies, poor plumbing, extremely filthy beds and toilets, fire hazards, insects, and
rats. Id. at 678-80. Such conditions are the equivalent to punishment and, therefore, invoke
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. at 686.
2. Id. at 678. Double-bunking (placing two inmates in a single cell) was a primary concern because lack of sufficient space increased tensions among inmates who were locked up
together for approximately twenty hours per day. Id. at 679.
3. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 734 F. Supp. 561, 561 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 915
F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990), and vacated and remanded,- U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d
867 (1992). Although judgment in the original suit was in favor of the inmates, the sheriff did
nothing to fulfill his obligations under the original court order. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 754-55,
116 L. Ed. 2d at 879. Finally, after judicial intervention, a consent decree was agreed upon in
1979. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 755, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 880. The decree incorporated an architectural program of the new facility which required that the facility include single occupancy
rooms of 70 square feet. Id.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). For modification to be appropriate, federal rules require that
"it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Id.
5. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 757, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 882. Sheriff Rufo requested
permission to double-bunk in cells designed only to accommodate one person. Id.
6. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 530-43 (1979) (holding that double-bunking does not
deprive pretrial detainees of their Fifth Amendment due process right).
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ling modification of the decree. 7 Sheriff Rufo also asserted that an allegedly
unanticipated increase in the pretrial detainee population created a change in
fact which made double-bunking necessary in the near future in order to
accommodate all of the detainees.' The United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts denied the motion, holding that Sheriff Rufo did
not produce a "clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by a new and unforeseen condition" as required by cases interpreting Rule 60(b). 9 The court
also rejected Sheriff Rufo's claim of a change in law, holding that the
Supreme Court's 1979 decision was merely a clarification of existing law.' °
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 1 The United States Supreme Court granted2
certiorari to determine whether sufficient grounds for modification existed. 1
Held - vacated and remanded. Consent decrees resulting from institutional-reform litigation may be modified upon showing a significant change
in law or fact and a modification appropriately tailored to that change.13
Consent decrees are compromises reached by disputing parties that are
approved and signed by a judge.' 4 This combination of agreement and judicial intervention makes the consent decree a hybrid of a contract and a judi7. See Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 756, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 881 (arguing change in law
based on Court's 1979 decision in Bell).
8. Id.
9. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561, 563 (D. Mass.), aff'd,
915 F.2d 1557 (lst Cir. 1990), and rev'd sub nom. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1992). The court found that the increase in
detainees had in fact been foreseen or was a foreseeable problem. Id. at 564. The "grievous
least wrong" standard was developed by Justice Cardozo in 1932 and states that "[n]othing
less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by a new and unforeseen condition should
lead . . . to [a] change [in] what was decreed after years of litigation ....
United States v.
Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932).
10. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 564.
11. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 915 F.2d 1557, 1557 (1st Cir. 1990), rev'd
sub nom. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867
(1992). The First Circuit affirmed without a written opinion. Id.
12. Rufb, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 867.
13. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 752-53, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 877.
14. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 734 F. Supp. 561, 563 (D. Mass.) (noting
that prison inmates and government officials entered into consent decree formally approved by
district court), aff'd, 915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990), and vacated and remanded, - U.S. ,
112 S. Ct. 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1992); see also Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 858 (5th Cir.
1987) (stating that district court approved stipulation); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 958 (2d Cir. 1983) (permitting negotiation between two
parties); 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 173 (1947) (discussing evolution of consent decrees); 31 AM.
JUR. Judgments § 458 (1940) (stating that courts have power to approve consent agreements
between disputing parties); Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in InstitutionalReform
Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1020 n.2 (1986) (indicating that consent decree is judicial
approval of compromise between parties). The court's stamp of approval is necessary to make
the decree judicially enforceable. See 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 173 (1947) (explaining significance
of judicial approval).
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cial order.' 5 Consent decrees bind the parties to their promises and
terminate any further litigation, thus conserving time and money.' 6 The use
of consent decrees is both advantageous and efficient because the parties
craft the decrees rather than a third party. 17 Because the terms of the decree
are not set by the court, parties may negotiate agreements providing for
broader remedies than those available to the court. 18
The past thirty years have witnessed the growth of a new form of judgment-the institutional reform consent decree. 9 Distinguishable from gen15. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, - U.S. -, -, 112 S. Ct. 748, 751, 116 L.
Ed. 2d 867, 876 (1992) (demonstrating combination of contractual agreement and judicial enforcement); United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 106 (1932) (requiring that plaintiffs and defendants agree to terms monitored by court); Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 768 F.
Supp. 1224, 1240 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (illustrating example of judicial modification of consent

decrees); see also 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 173 (1947) (stating that consent decrees are like contracts with approval of court); Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1020 n.2 (1986) (recognizing this hybridization). As
one commentator has noted, "[A] consent decree resembles a private contract in that it represents an agreement of the parties in settlement of litigation." Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 726. Yet,
such decrees retain an injunctive nature in that, once they are approved by the judge, the court
enforces compliance. Id. The courts primarily construe consent decrees as contracts, relying
on the "four corners" of the agreement. Id.
16. See Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting time and money
saved by decrees); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 725 (stating that consent decrees settle
disputes and are more economical than litigation).
17. See Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-Colon, 951 F.2d 1325, 1338 (1st Cir. 1991) (acknowledging court's role as policy manager in consent decrees); Kozlowski, 871 F.2d at 246
(expressing need for parties to resolve questions of institutional reform); Carey, 706 F.2d at
959 (allowing plaintiffs, not court, to decide number of beds per location); see also Lloyd C.
Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REV. 725, 725-26 (noting that judges only approve decrees); Note, The Modification of Consent
Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1020 n.2 (1986) (recognizing that parties sculpt consent agreements).
18. See Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 762-63, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 889 (showing that
parties may undertake to do more than is constitutionally required to settle disputes); Local
92, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986) (permitting parties to
impose remedies greater than court could impose); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738
(1974) (allowing remedy to exceed constitutional minimum). It is not considered an abuse of
discretion for the court to allow a party to a consent judgment to undertake more than the
court could order via the Constitution. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 762, 116 L. Ed. 2d at
888. See generally 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 178 (1947) (stating that consent decree is not invalid
because it obligates parties to do more than they are required); Note, The Modification of
Consent Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1027-41 (1986)
(noting that consent decrees expand number of potential remedies).
19. See Kozlowski, 871 F.2d at 247 (noting emergence of institutional-reform consent decrees during past twenty years); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295, 295
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (involving constitutional rights of prison inmates); Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 861
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eral consent decrees, institutional reform consent decrees do not exist
between private parties, but rather between the government and a private
party.2 ° They usually result from suits against the government for reformation of public institutions rather than for monetary compensation. 2 ' Desegregating schools, improving quality of care for disabled patients, and
correcting prison overcrowding problems are just a few examples of typical
relief sought by institutional-reform decree plaintiffs.2 2 These decrees are
generally designed to accomplish goals gradually over a specified period of
time. 23 The nature of institutional-reform consent decrees-because they al-

(noting rise in institutional reform litigation). See generally Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 725 (recog-

nizing growth in number of structural reform cases); Note, The Modification of Consent
Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1020 (1986) (discussing
increase in suits against public institutions).
20. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, - U.S .....
111 S. Ct.
630, 630, 112 L. Ed. 2d 715, 715 (1991) (consent decree between private party and city Board
of Education); Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing differences in
general decrees and institutional-reform decrees); Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 857 (illustrating example
of consent decree between private parties and state institutions); Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d
420, 421 (4th Cir. 1981) (involving consent decree between private party and prison institution); Lorain NAACP, 768 F. Supp. at 1242 n.22 (listing governmental defendants as characteristic of institutional-reform litigation); see also Note, Institutional Reform Litigation:
Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE L.J. 1474, 1474 (1982) (listing institutions
commonly involved in reform litigation); Note, The Modification of ConsentDecrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1033 (1986) (stating that government is
original defendant in institutional-reform litigation).
21. See, e.g., Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 754, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 879 (suing for
reformation of prison conditions); Kozlowski, 871 F.2d at 241 (inmates suing for prison reform); Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 958 (plaintiff class suing for reformation of conditions at state
school for mentally handicapped); Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in
StructuralReform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 725 (noting that plaintiffs seek structural reformation of institutions); see also Note, Institutional Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE L.J. 1474, 1474 (1982) (listing institutional reforms
sought by plaintiffs); Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1020 (1986) (stating that plaintiffs do not just seek compensation
but rather long-term reforms). Plaintiffs typically sue for reformation as opposed to compensation because money damages would not adequately correct an on-going violation of the
plaintiff's constitutional rights. See generally id. at 1020 (discussing need for flexible standards
in consent decree modification).
22. See Dowell, - U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 633, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 723 (demonstrating
school desegregation decree); Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 857 (discussing prison-reform consent decree);
Carey, 706 F.2d at 958 (involving decree for quality of patient care); see also Donald L.
Horowitz, Decreeing OrganizationalChange: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983
DUKE L.J. 1265, 1265 (citing types of reform sought in institutional reform litigation); Note,
Institutional Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE L.J. 1474,
1474 (1982) (listing examples of relief sought by plaintiffs).
23. See, e.g., Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 756, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 881 (building new
facilities by specified date); Carey, 706 F.2d at 958 (defendant having difficulty meeting goals

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol24/iss2/12

4

Lindsay: Consent Decrees Resulting from Institutional-Reform Litigation Ma

1993]

CASENOTES

most always implicate constitutional rights-makes them important not
only to the parties involved, but also to third parties and the public at
large.24 Due to the long-term nature of these institutional consent decrees,

their terms are often based on speculation as to future circumstances, thus
creating a potential need for future modification as those circumstances
change.25
Theoretically, parties enter consent decrees with the intent that they be
final judgments; in reality, however, some decrees prove unworkable due to
unexpected changes in conditions.2 6 For example, modification may also be

after considerable effort and passage of time); Nelson, 659 F.2d at 422 (placing deadline on
long-term reformation of prison system); see also Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in
InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1020 (1986) (noting that institutional
reforms are typically long-term endeavors). See generally Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation
of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 725-29 (discussing implementation process of institutional reform decrees). These objectives take a considerable amount of time to accomplish because they usually involve reform of great magnitude that
requires an inordinate amount of time, planning, and effort. Id.
24. See, e.g., Plyler v. Evatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1324 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that institutional
reform litigation is aimed at broad public policy objectives); Kozlowski, 871 F.2d at 251 (explaining that modification of consent decrees should take into consideration public interests
involved); Lorain, 768 F. Supp. at 1241 (stating that institutional consent decrees usually involve significant public interests); see also Note, Institutional Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE L.J. 1474, 1474 (1982) (noting that institutional-reform
litigation affects individuals who are not actual parties); Note, The Modification of Consent
Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1032 (1986) (discussing
impact of institutional reform litigation on general public).
25. See Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 753, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 877 (holding that speculation of future prison population was incorrect and therefore potential reason for modification);
Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 298-99 (giving unforeseen circumstances as basis for modification of consent decree); Carey, 706 F.2d at 970-71 (modifying decree because of unattainable
objectives). See generallyLloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of ConsentDecrees in Structural
Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 726 (noting need to modify consent agreements);
Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1020, 1021 (1986) (discussing inevitability of modification in some consent decrees).
26. See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 734 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), aff'd,
915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990), and vacated and remanded, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 748, 116 L.
Ed. 2d 867 (1992) (seeking modification due to rise in prison detainee population); Heath v. De
Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1110 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that change in conditions could warrant
modification); Kozlowski v. Coughlin, 871 F.2d 241, 251 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that sometimes decrees should be amenable to modification when circumstances change); Twelve John
Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (seeking decree modification
because of rise in prison population); Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 1987)
(finding modification proper if due to changing circumstances); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1983) (meeting demands of decree proved impossible due to lack of necessary facilities for mentally handicapped); Nelson v.
Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir. 1981) (requesting modification due to unexpected rise in
prison population); see also Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Construction and Application of
Rule 60(b)(6) of FederalRules of Civil ProcedureAuthorizing Relief from FinalJudgment or
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necessary if the dangers which the decree was intended to remedy are subse-

quently eliminated. 27 The courts have the inherent power to order such
modifications,2" and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give the courts the
express power to revise consent decrees when the original provisions are no
longer equitable.29

Order for "Any Other Reason", 15 A.L.R. FED. 193, 225 (1973) (explaining how changed
circumstances can be basis for modification of limits); Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule 60(b)(5) of FederalRules of Civil ProcedureAuthorizing Relieffrom FinalJudgment Where Its ProspectiveApplication Is Inequitable, 14 A.L.R. FED. 309,
316-17 (1973) (noting that unforeseen changes are basis for modification); Lloyd C. Anderson,
Implementation of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform Decrees, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725,
727 (acknowledging that certain decree provisions may become unworkable).
27. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffok County Jail, - U.S.....-, 112 S. Ct. 748, 762, 116 L.
Ed. 2d 867, 886 (1992) (stating that modification is warranted if statutory or decisional law
changed to make legal what decree was designed to remedy); Board of Educ. of Okla. City
Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, - U.S.....-, 111 S. Ct. 630, 633-35, 112 L. Ed. 2d 715, 723-25 (1991)
(arguing that five years of decree provisions have eliminated danger and allow for decree dissolution); Systems Fed'n v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 648 (1961) (permitting previously prohibited
actions when law upon which decree was based had changed); see also Lloyd C. Anderson,
Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725,
753 (noting that elimination of dangers allows for modification); Timothy S. Jost, From Swift
to Stotts and Beyond. Modification of Injunctions in Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101,
1104 (1986) (demonstrating that change in law may eliminate problem). The problems that
the decrees seek to remedy may be eliminated because new laws may turn what was illegal into
something legal. Rufo, - U.S. at -_, 112 S. Ct. at 762, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 888.
28. See United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932) (Justice Cardozo asserting power
of courts to modify decrees); Heath, 888 F.2d at 1110 (noting that courts have power to modify
consent decrees); Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 297 (stating that decrees are subject to modification by courts); Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 860 (recognizing that courts retain power to modify consent decrees); Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming court's power of
decree modification); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 754 (agreeing that courts have modification
power regardless of whether or not stated in decree); Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and
Beyond: Modifications of Injunctions in Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REv. 1101, 1105 (1986)
(illustrating that courts' power to modify can be found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)). Courts retain the power to modify continually changing consent decrees because, as
Justice Cardozo argued, a consent decree is a combination of contract law and a court order;
therefore courts can correct future wrongs whether or not the right was reserved in the decree.
Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986
U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 754 n.91.
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). See, e.g., Rufo, - U.S. at -_, 112 S. Ct. at 756, 116 L. Ed.
2d at 881 (decree provisions no longer equitable under Rule 60(b)(5)); Twelve John Does, 861
F.2d at 297 (examining modification of consent decrees); Carey, 706 F.2d at 960 (considering
Rule 60(b)(5) modification of consent decrees owing to unattainable decree provisions). See
generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Construction and Application of Rule 60(b)(5) of
FederalRules of Civil ProcedureAuthorizing Relieffrom FinalJudgment Where Its Prospective
Application Is Inequitable, 14 A.L.R. FED. 309, 311 (1973) (noting reasons for allowing modification under Rule 60(b)(5)); Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Struc-
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In Swift v. United States,3" a landmark decision by the United States
Supreme Court, Justice Cardozo set a strict standard for modification of
consent decrees, requiring movants to demonstrate extreme, unexpected
hardship and oppression. 3 Justice Cardozo adopted this rigid standard in
order to protect small, weak parties from larger, more powerful ones.32
Many appellate courts still rely on Justice Cardozo's opinion and have
adopted his "strict test.", 33 However, there is a modem trend toward adopting a more flexible standard. 34 This "flexible test" is deemed particularly
appropriate in the case of the institutional-reform consent decree because of
its speculative, long-term nature. 35 The typical, flexible standard utilized by

tural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 757 (discussing codification of power to
modify consent decrees in Rule 60(b)(5)).
30. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
31. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119. Justice Cardozo, in defining his strict "grievous wrong" test,
stated that defendants must show that they are "suffering hardship so extreme and unexpected
as to justify us in saying that they are the victims of oppression." Id. The reasons behind the
strict standard include: advancing policies favoring settlement, conserving stability, preserving
legitimacy and authority of the courts, helping to prevent further litigation, and preventing
deprivation of hard-won benefits. See generally Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent
Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 753 (discussing reasons for
strict standards); Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions
in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1129-31 (1986) (listing justifications for strict
standard).
32. Swift, 286 U.S. at 118. Cardozo's test was designed to prevent monopolistic meat
companies from destroying the businesses of small grocers. Id.
33. See, e.g., Kearney v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 915 F.2d 1557, 1557 (1st Cir.
1990) (affirming decision to adopt strict standard); Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 301 (using
rigid test in deciding questions of modification); Neely v. City of Grenada, 799 F.2d 203, 211
(5th Cir. 1986) (applying strict standard and allowing modification upon showing that purpose
of decree is fulfilled); Roberts v. St. Regis Paper Co., 653 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir. 1981) (utilizing strict test); see also Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of
Injunctions in the FederalCourts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (1986) (noting that Swift opinion still dominates to large extent); Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional
Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1024 (1986) (applying cases that follow Swift).
34. See, e.g., Rufo, - U.S. at -_,
112 S. Ct. at 765, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 892 (adopting more
flexible test due to nature of institutional reform decree modification); Heath, 888 F.2d at
1108-09 (holding strict standard inappropriate for reform decree); Carey, 706 F.2d at 970 (allowing "freer" modification); Nelson, 659 F.2d at 429 (granting modification under flexible
standard). See generally Bruce Fein, Loosening the Ties of Consent Decrees, LEGAL TIMES,
Feb. 3, 1992, at 22 (discussing flexible approach used in Rufo); Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of InstitutionalReform Decrees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1992, at 3 (noting change to more
flexible standard). Advancing public interest, correcting wrongs of unworkable decrees and
inequitable provisions, and accommodating change are a few reasons for adopting a flexible
test. Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1137-48 (1986).
35. See Plyler v. Ivatt, 924 F.2d 1321, 1324 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing uniqueness of
institutional reform litigation); Heath, 888 F.2d at 1109 (stating that institutional-reform consent decrees are fundamentally different from general decrees and requiring different modifica-
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federal courts requires the movants to establish a significant change in law or
fact and an appropriately designed modification of the institutional-reform
decree. 3 6 Under the flexible model, requested modifications should seek to
accommodate changed circumstances and should not redraft the decree.37
Although the flexible standard for modification of institutional-reform
consent decrees is growing in popularity, the circuit courts are still split between the strict and flexible tests. 38 However, the recent Supreme Court
decision, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,39 may soon end this
debate.'

tion standards); Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. of Educ., 768 F. Supp. 1224, 1240-41 (N.D.
Ohio 1991) (giving reasons for different modification standard for reform decrees); see also
Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 1986
U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 753 (recognizing that strict standard should not always be used); Note,
The Modification of Consent Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1020, 1032 (1986) (noting speculative nature of reform decrees should allow for easier
modification).
36. See Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 762, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 888 (requiring change in
law or fact); Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 861 (stating change in law or fact as requirement for modification); Nelson, 659 F.2d at 424 (allowing modification upon showing of change in law or fact);
see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 755 (discussing changed circumstances as requisite of modification); Bruce Fein, Loosening the Ties of Consent Decrees, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 1992, at 24
(listing requirements for decree modification). Many courts also demand that this change be
unforeseen and that movants show a good-faith effort to comply. Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d
at 300. Courts may also want the movants to show that the modification is in the best interests
of the general public. Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1148 (1986).
37. See Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 760, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 886 (stating that modification should accommodate changed circumstance); Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 861 (requiring that modification does not frustrate original purpose of decree); Lorain NAACP, 768 F. Supp. at 1242
(noting that modification should work toward effectuating purpose of decrees, not toward rewriting it). See generally Bruce Fein, Loosening the Ties of Consent Decrees, LEGAL TIMES,
Feb. 3, 1992, at 24 (stating holding in Rufo); Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of Institutional
Reform Decrees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1992 at 3 (discussing requirements of modifications in
Rufo).
38. See Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 867 (adopting flexible test).
Compare Heath, 888 F.2d at 1108-09 (supporting flexible standard) with Twelve John Does, 861
F.2d at 301 (advocating rigid test). See generally Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and
Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (1986)
(stating that Swift opinion is still widely used); Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in
InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1024 (1986) (citing cases that follow
Swift).
39. - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 748, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1992).
40. See id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 748-49, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 867-68 (stating that flexible test is
to be used in institutional-reform litigation). See generally Bruce Fein, Loosening the Ties of
ConsentDecrees, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 1992 at 24 (noting future impact of Rufo); Martin A.
Schwartz, Modification of Consent Decrees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1992, at 3 (discussing significance of Rufo opinion).
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In Rufo, the United States Supreme Court completely abandoned the application of Justice Cardozo's "grievous wrong" test in requests for modification of consent decrees arising from institutional-reform litigation.41
Writing for the majority, Justice White first explained that Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) authorizes modification of consent decrees when
their enforcement becomes inequitable.42 Therefore, the majority argued
that district courts need broad modification power in order to implement the
objectives of Rule 60(b)(5) with regard to institutional-reform consent decrees. 43 Justice White further explained that because many reform decrees
last for a number of years, and circumstances invariably change, modifications should be readily available to achieve the goals of reform litigation."
For these reasons, the majority held that the "grievous wrong" standard
does not apply to institutional-reform consent decrees.4 5 Under the new
standard adopted by the Court, modification may be obtained if movants can
establish a change in fact or law that makes compliance with the consent
decree provisions substantially more onerous, unworkable, or harmful to the
public interest.4 6 If the changes were foreseen at the time the decree was
agreed upon, the Court placed a heavier burden on the movants to show that
although they entered the decree in "good faith" and attempted to comply
with its provisions, modification is still necessary. 47 Finally, the Court required that the modification be appropriately tailored to the changed
condition.4 8
With regard to the new standard, the majority noted that in deciding
whether to allow modification, district courts should give great deference to
state and local government officials because they understand both what is
needed and what can be done to achieve community goals.4 9 The majority
also acknowledged that it would be unfair to make new local officials comply
with provisions agreed upon by their predecessors.5 0 Justice White emphasized that district courts should permit modifications unless the modifications would create or perpetuate greater problems or constitutional

41. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. 749, 116 L. Ed. 2d 869. The Supreme Court noted that
Justice Cardozo's test was too rigid and that a more flexible test was needed. Id. at -, 112 S.
Ct. at 760, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 886.
42. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 757, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 883.
43. Id. at - ,112 S. Ct. at 760, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 886.
44. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 758, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 884.
45. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 764-65, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 892.
46. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 760, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 886.
47. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 760-61, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 887.
48. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 764, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 891.
49. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 764, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 891.
50. Id.
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violations. 5
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's
judgment but not with its reasoning.52 Justice O'Connor felt that the district
court had not abused its discretion and that its opinion should have been
affirmed. a Justice O'Connor emphasized that the nature of the Court's review was quite limited because appellate review for consent decrees should
examine only whether the district court abused its discretion, not whether
the appellate court would have reached the same conclusion as the district
court.5 4 Justice O'Connor also recognized that district court judges, such as
Rufo's Judge Keeton, are likely to have years of experience with the
problems and the parties at hand, making them the most qualified to decide
modification issues. 55
Although Justice O'Connor agreed with the judgment, she noted several
problems with the majority opinion.5 6 First, Justice O'Connor noted that
the case could not have a truly satisfactory outcome.57 The Justice explained that because "[t]he new jail is simply too small ...[s]omeone has to
suffer, and it is not likely to be the government officials responsible for underestimating the inmate population and delaying the construction of the
jail. [I]t is likely to be ...the inmates."5 " Further, Justice O'Connor observed that the district court recognized that single-occupancy cells were the
"most important element" of the consent decree.59 According to Justice
O'Connor, the majority's conclusion that the modification of this central element was an inadequate basis for denial of modification was unsupported by
51. See id. at -., 112 S. Ct. at 764, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 891-92 (noting that modification is
virtually always allowed).
52. Id. at .,112 S. Ct. at 765, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 892 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 765, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 842 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor gave two main reasons for believing that Judge Keeton may not have
fully exercised his discretion. Id. First, Judge Keeton required that the change in circumstance be unforeseen under the grievous wrong standard. Id. at -,112 S. Ct. at 766, 116 L.
Ed. 2d at 893-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor contended that changes, even
when anticipated, may require modification to preserve equity under Rule 60(b)(5). Id. Second, Justice O'Connor stated that "[w]hile the lack of resources can never excuse a failure to
obey constitutional requirements," the district court still should have considered Suffolk
County's resources in deciding whether continued compliance with the decree obligations remained equitable. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. 766, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 893-94 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). For these reasons, Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the case
should be remanded, but only to allow the district court to exercise proper discretion. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at -.
, 112 S. Ct. 766, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 893-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. See id. (recognizing errors in majority opinion).
57. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 764, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 892 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
58. Id. at .,112 S. Ct. at 766-67, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. Id. at .,112 S. Ct. at 767, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 895 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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authority. Disagreeing with the majority,' Justice O'Connor also asserted
that modification of one provision of the decree, especially the most important one, could sometimes completely defeat the purpose of the decree
although the decree was well-drafted, workable, or essentially valid.6" As an
example, the Justice charged that if the district court were to find that the
inmates would never have entered into the consent decree had it not been for
the single-occupancy cell provision, it would not be an abuse of the court's
discretion to deny the request for modification.62 Finally, Justice O'Connor
found problematic the majority's opinion concerning the great deference
granted to the state and local governmental officials.6 3 The Justice conceded
that deference in resolving day-to-day issues is necessary, but emphasized
that "[d]eference to one of the parties to a lawsuit is usually not the surest
path to equity," especially when one of the movants has had a very poor
record of compliance." 4 Justice O'Connor further contended that district
courts should not be forced to give deference to one side over another, because the views of both sides are important for a just decision.65
Justice Stevens and Blackmun joined in a dissenting opinion, agreeing
with the majority on the issue of developing a flexible standard for some
reform decrees but disagreeing with the majority's use of the standard in
Rufo.66 Justices Stevens and Blackmun explained that the flexible standard
articulated by Judge Friendly in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc, v. Carey67 is appropriate for modification of most institutional
reform consent decrees.68 Judge Friendly's test states that modification is
justified if the provisions are not working or are unnecessarily burdensome
and if the modified decree would better achieve the goals of the consent decree. 69 Judge Friendly further noted that requested modifications should be
analyzed in light of the central purpose of the decree so as to be consistent
with that purpose. ° The dissent of Justices Stevens and Blackmun addressed the issue of central purpose and concluded that Sheriff Rufo's re-

60. Id.
61. Rufo, - U.S. at -., 112 S. Ct. at 767, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 895 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor is referring to the majority's assertion that if modification of one
decree provision undermines the central purpose of the decree, then that decree is essentially
invalid. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at __, 112 S. Ct. at 767, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 895 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

64. Id.
65. Rufo,

-

U.S. at

-,

112 S. Ct. at 768, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 896 (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
66. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. 706 F.2d 956 (2d 1983).
68. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 768, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 896 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at - n._, 112 S. Ct. at 770 n.2, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 898 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 772, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 901 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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quested modification would severely undermine the decree's main purpose
because, as reflected in the decree's history, prohibition of double-bunking
was a central purpose of the decree.7" Justice Stevens expressly stated that
"[i]t is particularly important to apply a strict standard when considering
modification requests that undermine the central purpose of a consent
decree." 72
The movant's history of noncompliance was also taken into account by
the dissenters." The dissenting justices noted that it was nineteen years after the inmates filed suit before the new jail was completed, and at least five
years after the entrance of the consent decree before the movants even
started to make a plan for compliance. 74 Justices Stevens and Blackmum
also insisted that the Sheriff's claim of fiscal limitation illustrates a perpetual
reluctance to allocate funds adequate to avoid the initial violation or to comply with the decree."' The dissenters also recognized that as soon as compliance was achieved, the movants sought modification in order to comply no
longer.76
Finally, the dissenters explained that although the movants had not anticipated the increase in detainee population when the consent decree was formulated, the increase was obviously anticipated when the movants sought
modification of the decree to allow for more cells in 1985.77 The movants,
therefore, had foreseen this potential problem for at least four years and had
failed to take sufficient preventative measures while the problem could still
be corrected. 78 Furthermore, the 1985 modification explicitly stated that capacity could be increased so long as "single-cell occupancy is maintained
under the design for the facility.", 79 In closing, Justices Stevens and Blackmun reminded the movants that they had committed themselves to providing single cells in 1979, that they had reaffirmed this promise in 1985 and
that, therefore, their commitment should be honored to prevent compromising the motives for entering into consent decrees. 80

71. Id.
72. Rufo,
U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 772, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 900-01 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Id. at __,112 S. Ct. at 769, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 897 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at .,112
S. Ct. at 772, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 900-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 769, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 897 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 771, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 899-900 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In
1985, the movants requested modification of the consent decree to allow for a larger facility

because of an unanticipated increase in detainee population. Id.
78. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 771, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 899-900 (Stevens, J., dissenting). When
movants finally requested the modification at hand, the problem could no longer be corrected
by enlarging the facility because the prison was essentially completed. Id.

79. Id. at
80. Rufo,

-,
-

112 S. Ct. at 769, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 897 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 773, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 902 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The strict "grievous wrong" standard developed by Justice Cardozo was
designed to protect weak individuals and small classes from large groups and

powerful institutions.8 The majority in Rufo stated several logical reasons
why the strict test is not appropriate for institutional-reform consent decrees, including the long-term nature of the decrees and their effects on public interests.8 2 However, the reasons behind the majority's excessively
flexible test may have had their roots elsewhere-namely, in the Court's tradition of granting somewhat undue deference to governmental bodies in order to preserve harmony among them. 3

There are several elements of the majority's "test" that demonstrate its

over-flexibility.8" First, in Rufo, the majority noted that Rule 60(b)(5) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows modification of a consent decree if

The dissenters recognize that litigants will be reluctant to enter into consent decrees if they are
so easily and readily modifiable. Id.
81. See United States v. Swift, 286 U.S. 106, 117 (1932) (discussing need to prevent huge
monopolies from destroying their weaker competition). In Swift, the consent decree was
designed to protect small grocery store suppliers from large, monopolistic meat-packing companies because the companies were in a position to "starve out weaker rivals." See id. Ruiz v.
Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting reasons for strict test); New York State
Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1983) (recognizing
Justice Cardozo's protection of small businesses from unfair practices of large companies); see
also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 753 (noting that strict test prevents harm to private parties by
refusing requests of institutions to lower their obligations); Note, The Modification of Consent
Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1022-24 (1986) (revealing
reasoning of Swift opinion).
82. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, - U.S ....
112 S. Ct. 748, 751-53, 116 L.
Ed. 2d 867, 876-77 (1992); see Board of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, - U.S. -,
111 S. Ct. 630, 636-37, 112 L. Ed. 2d 715, 724 (1991) (noting speculative nature of consent
decrees); Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that long-term
nature required flexible modification standard for institutional-reform consent decrees); Carey,
706 F.2d at 969 (discussing reasons for flexible test); Nelson v. Collins, 659 F.2d 420, 424 (4th
Cir. 1981) (discussing applicability of flexible modification standards). See generally Note, The
Modification of Consent Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020,
1032-36 (1986) (distinguishing institutional-reform consent decrees from general consent decrees); Bruce Fein, Loosening the Ties of Consent Decrees, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 1992, at 24
(discussing Supreme Court's reasons for adopting flexible modification test)..
83. See William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial Appointees and Antitrust in the 1990s, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 111 (1991) (noting Supreme Court's explicit deference to government);
Lisa Simotas, In Search of a Balance: AIDS, Rape, and the Special Needs Doctrine, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1881, 1923 (1991) (discussing deference given by Supreme Court to judgment of governmental entities). See generally Jean M. Meaux, Justice Scalia and Judicial Restraint: A
Conservative Resolution of Conflict Between Individual and State, 62 TUL. L. REV. 225, 246
(1987) (revealing Justice Scalia's heightened deference to government that usually works to
detriment of minorities).
84. See generallyRufo, -_U.S.at__, 112 S. Ct. at 754-64, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 879-92 (1992)
(explaining elements of majority's reasoning that are too lax on governmental institutions).
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the decree proves to be inequitable; yet the majority, in its "flexible test,"
lowered this requirement by allowing modification upon the showing of a
mere burden.85 It further follows from Rule 60(b)(5) that a change in law or
fact, in order to support modification, would have to render the decree provision inequitable; therefore, simply showing that a change occurred, as required by the majority, would be inadequate.86 Although the majority
required movants to show a good faith effort to comply with a decree if the
movants had anticipated the changes before entering into the consent decree,
the majority failed to affix this same burden to movants who anticipated
changes after entering the decree but ignored them, allowing them to develop to the point where they would justify modification of the decree.8 7
These governmental movants should be required to request modification as
soon as the changes are anticipated 8so as to prove good faith and to avoid the
potential for incurrable problems.1
The majority's assertion that governmental parties seeking modification of

85. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 760, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 887; see Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 858 (requiring
more than burden to warrant modification); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F.
Supp. 561, 563 (D. Mass.) (noting that Rule 60(b)(5) requires that consent decrees be inequitable in order to justify modification), aff'd, 915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Lloyd C.
Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REV. 725, 757 (elaborating on what is inequitable under Rule 60(b)(5)); Timothy S. Jost, From
Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification ofInjunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV.
1101, 1105 (1986) (discussing minimum requirements of Rule 60(b)(5)).
86. See Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 857 (denying modification because implementation of consent
decree difficult but not impossible); Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295,
301 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing modification because consent decree still workable); Carey, 706
F.2d at 971 (granting modification of consent decree provision); see also Lloyd C. Anderson,
Implementation of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725,
758 (reasoning that to modify decree provisions, change in circumstance must render provision
inequitable); Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in
the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (1986) (recognizing that Rule 60(b)(5) and
case law require inequitable consequence to justify modification).
87. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 759-60, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 886. The movants in Rufo
anticipated the increase in prison population at least four years prior to the requested modification at issue. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 756, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 881. The movants conveniently
waited for the jail to be essentially completed before requesting to double-bunk, therefore
preventing resolution of the problem by simply increasing the number of cells to be built. Id.
88. See Swift, 286 U.S. at 114-15 (requiring changes warranting modification to be unforeseen); Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 298 (denying modification because overcrowding
problem was anticipated years before requested modification and therefore showed movants'
bad faith); Carey, 706 F.2d at 964 (opining that unforeseen changes that render decree inequitable are basis for modification); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 755 (1986) (discussing grant
modification upon showing of unforeseen obstacles); Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of Institutional Reform Decrees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1992, at 3 (explaining that unforeseen factual
changes which make decrees unworkable will justify modification). The dissent in Rufo recognized that if the movants had moved for an additional increase in the number of cells prior to
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institutional-reform consent decrees should receive deference makes this
"test" biased against private parties and does not foster equitable results.8 9
The majority established the deferential standard not only because government officials are qualified to assess the situation, but also because it would
be unfair to force new officials to comply with agreements made by past
officials.' ° However, it would also be unfair to force private parties, such as
the inmates of Suffolk County Jail, to give up judgments for which they have
fought and waited nineteen years. 9 Finally, in promulgating its flexible test,
the majority recognized the importance of narrowly tailored modifications
that do not attempt to rewrite the consent decree; yet, the majority allowed
modification of the decree's main provision which not only redrafted the
decree but essentially revoked it. 92
Justices O'Connor, Stevens, and Blackmun pointed out potential improvements to cure the weaknesses in the majority opinion. 93 Most importantly,

completion of the jail, then the problem at issue could have been avoided. Rufo, - U.S. at -'
112 S. Ct. at 772, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 901 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. See Rufo, - U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. at 764, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 891 (reasoning that new
officials may not agree to compliance of terms set by previous officials); see also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973) (granting deference to district court judges); Twelve John
Does, 861 F.2d at 301 (denying modification without granting deference to prison officials);
Lisa Simotas, In Search of a Balance: AIDS, Rape, and the Special Needs Doctrine, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1881, 1923 (1991) (noting inequities owing to excessive deference to government);
Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of InstitutionalReform Decrees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1992, at
3 (recognizing importance of Justice O'Connor's argument that government institutions
should not be granted deference in matters other than day-to-day decisions).
90. See Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 764, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 891 (reasoning that new
officials may be burdened by compliance of terms set by previous officials).
91. Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 302 (forcing institution to comply with decree obligations); Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 862-63 (refusing to take away rights for which prisoners had fought);
see Swift, 286 U.S. at 118 (noting that it would be unfair to small businesses to modify decree
and thereby take away movants' duty to uphold promises); see also Timothy S. Jost, From
Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the FederalCourts, 64 TEX. L. REV.
1101, 1110 (1986) (noting Cardozo's argument that courts should not easily modify provisions
parties have litigated many years to receive); Bruce Fein, Loosening the Ties of Consent Decrees, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 1992, at 22 (discussing majority's notion that compliance may be
onerous to future governmental officials).
92. See Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 301 (refusing to modify single-cell provision as it
was important element of the decree's remedy); Carey, 706 F.2d at 959 (stating that when
modifying decree's central provision, strict standard should be used to prevent elimination of
decree goals); Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 566 (denying modification of consent decree's central
purpose); see also Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation,
99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1026-27 (1986) (recognizing that modification should be used to
"fine-tune" consent decrees, not to rewrite them); Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of Consent Decrees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1992, at 3 (noting that modification should not have effect of
rewriting decree).
93. See Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 765, 768, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 892, 896 (O'Connor,
J., concurring and Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing problems with majority opinion). See gener-
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these Justices recognized that the central purpose or provision of institutional consent decrees should not be sacrificed through the modification process without courts applying a strict test.94 The dissenting Justices also

realized that to rule justly on the request to modify, the Court must adopt a
flexible test that takes into account the movant's prior history.9 5 For exam-

ple, the dissenters noted that the movants in Rufo had a history of noncompliance and had chosen to wait to request modification until the crowding problem was essentially incurable. 9 6 The dissent further recognized that

the movants failed to request modification as soon as they anticipated the
changes and, therefore, should have been subject to a "heavier burden" of
proof as to their good faith motives and efforts.97 The dissent also understood the importance of giving deference to the well-reasoned opinions of

ally Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of Institutional Reform Decrees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17,
1992, at 3 (discussing arguments in concurring and dissenting opinions of Rufo).
94. See Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 301 (refusing to modify single-cell provision as it
was important element of decree's remedy); Carey, 706 F.2d at 959 (arguing that when modifying decree's central provision, strict standard should be used to prevent elimination of decree
goals); Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 566 (denying modification of consent decree's central purpose); see also Note, The Modification of ConsentDecrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1026-27 (1986) (explaining that modification should be used only to
"fine-tune" consent decrees); Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of Consent Decrees, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 17, 1992, at 3 (noting that modification should not have effect of rewriting decree).
95. See,e.g.,
Dowell,- U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 637-38, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 729-31 (realizing
that decree's goals had been reached via movant's compliance); Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at
300 (finding that movant had not made good-faith attempt to comply and therefore modification denied); Carey, 706 F.2d at 959-60, 969 (granting modification because movants showed
good faith in past and decree was unworkable); Nelson, 659 F.2d at 422 (citing movant's good
prior history as reason to extend decree deadlines via modification of consent decree); Kearney,
734 F. Supp. at 565 (stating poor past history of compliance as reason to deny modification);
see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 753 (noting that classic modification test considers movant's
good faith in prior dealings); Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1022 (1986) (stating that prior history/good faith is
usually considered in decree modification decisions). The history of non-compliance, decree
violations, and attempts at abandonment give essential insight into the motives of the movants.
Id.
96. See Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 772, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 901 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing movants' poor compliance history and denying modification).
97. See Swift, 286 U.S. at 114-15 (requiring changes warranting modification to be unforeseen); Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 298 (denying modification because overcrowding
problem was anticipated years before requested modification and therefore showed movant's
bad faith); Carey, 706 F.2d at 964 (opining that unforeseen changes that render decree inequitable are basis for modification); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 725, 755 (discussing granting of
modification upon showing of unforeseen obstacles); Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of Institutional Reform Decrees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1992, at 3 (noting that unforeseen factual
changes which make decrees unworkable will justify modification).
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district court judges who have extensive knowledge of the cases and parties
involved.9" Finally, the dissent appreciated that future litigants will be reluctant to enter into consent decrees with governmental institutions if these
institutions can so easily escape their duties.99
The Supreme Court should have implemented a flexible test that strikes a
balance between Justice Cardozo's strict test and the majority's overly flexible one. °o The proper flexible test should first examine the movant's prior
history to determine if the movant has made a good-faith attempt at compliance. 10 Second, the requested modification should be analyzed in light of
the central purpose of the decree; and, if the requested modification might

98. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978) (recognizing that trial judges have
years of experience with problems at hand and deserve deference); Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d
at 300-01 (concluding that district court judge who supervised decree for considerable length
of time deserves special deference); Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 860 (stating decision to modify consent
decree properly rests with district court judges); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation
of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 755 (discussing
district court's power to modify consent decrees); Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of Institutional Reform Decrees, N.Y. L.J. Mar. 17, 1992, at 3 (noting that heightened deference should
be given to district court judges who have overseen institution in past). The decisions of these
judges should not easily be overturned as they are based on prior history of the parties as
witnessed by the judge. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 688.
99. See Rufo, - U.S. at .. , 112 S. Ct. at 772, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 901 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting future ramifications of majority decision); Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 301-02
(refusing modification in order to preserve integrity of consent decrees); see also Lloyd C.
Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L.
REv. 725, 756 (discussing possibility that flexible test would discourage voluntary settlement
of litigation); Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in
the FederalCourts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1125 (1986) (listing efficiency and reliance on judgments as benefits which encourage settlement through consent decrees).
100. See generallyDowell, - U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 630, 633-36, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 715,
719-22 (permitting modification after applying flexible test that considered movant's prior history and decree's central purpose); Carey, 706 F.2d at 969 (applying appropriate flexible standard which did not jeopardize central purpose of decree); Nelson, 659 F.2d at 429 (granting
modification upon application of flexible test that considered movant's good or bad faith); see
also Note, The Modification of Consent Dccrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1020, 1029-30 (1986) (discussing various versions of flexible modification test put forth
by lower federal courts). See generally Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Constructionand Application of Rule 60(b)(5) of FederalRules of Civil ProcedureAuthorizing Relieffrom FinalJudgment Where Its Prospective Application is Inequitable, 14 A.L.R. FED. 309, 313-15 (1991)
(discussing use of flexible test in modification of judgments).
101. See, e.g., Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 300 (movant's good faith attempt to comply
not found and therefore modification denied); Carey, 706 F.2d at 959 (granting modification
because movants showed good faith in past and decree was unworkable); Nelson, 659 F.2d at
422 (citing movant's good prior history as reason to extend decree deadlines via modification
of consent decree); Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 562 (giving poor past history of compliance as
reason to deny modification); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees
in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 753 (noting that classic modification test considers movant's good faith in prior dealings); Note, The Modification of Consent
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affect the central purpose or provision of the decree, then the strict test
should be applied.' 0 2 To grant modification, the movants should prove a
significant change in law or fact that renders the decree inequitable. 0 3 This
change should not have been foreseen by the movants upon entrance into the
decree; if the change was anticipated, the movants should satisfy a heavier
burden to show that the decree was entered into and acted upon in good
faith.'° After the decree is entered, if the movants anticipate a change, the
movants should be required to make every effort to resolve developing
problems to keep future modifications to a minimum. 0 5 Therefore, modification should be granted only if the decree provisions prove to be truly inequitable, making compliance illegal, virtually impossible, or a hindrance to
the goals of the decree. "0

Decrees in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1022 (1986) (stating that
prior history/good faith is usually considered in decree modification decisions).
102. See Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 301 (refusing to modify single-cell provision as it
was important element of decree's remedy); Carey, 706 F.2d at 959 (arguing that when modifying decree's central provision strict standard should be used to prevent elimination of decree
goals); Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 566 (denying modification of consent decree's central purpose); see also Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modificationof Injunctions in
the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (1986) (discussing requirements of Rule
60(b)(5)); Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1026-27 (1986) (recognizing that modification should not be used to
rewrite consent decrees); Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of Consent Decrees, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 17, 1992, at 3 (explaining that modification should not rewrite decree).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5); Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 760, 116 L. Ed. 2d at
886; see Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 860 (requiring more than burden to warrant modification); Kearney,
734 F. Supp. at 563 (noting that Rule 60(b)(5) requires that consent decrees be inequitable in
order to justify modification); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees
in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 757 (elaborating on what is inequitable under Rule 60(b)(5)); Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of
Injunctions in the FederalCourts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (1986) (discussing requirements
of Rule 60(b)(5)).
104. See Swift, 286 U.S. at 114-15 (requiring changes warranting modification to be unforeseen); Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 298-99 (denying modification because overcrowding
problem was anticipated years before requested modification and therefore showed movant's
bad faith); Carey, 706 F.2d at 967 (opining that unforeseen changes that render decree inequitable are basis for modification); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 755-56 (1986) (discussing
modification upon showing of unforeseen obstacles); Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of Institutional Reform Decrees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1992, at 3 (noting unforeseen factual changes
which make decrees unworkable will justify modification).
105. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 772-73, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 901-02 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
106. See Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 301 (denying modification because consent decree
was still workable); Carey, 706 F.2d at 970-77 (allowing modification because implementation
of decree was impossible and decree goal could not be reached without adjusting decree); Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 566 (refusing modification because implementation of decree was not
impossible or illegal); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Struc-
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If modification is granted, the modification should be narrowly tailored to
accommodate the changed circumstance.1 °7 If modification decisions are
appealed, deference should be given to the district court judges who are familiar with the facts, circumstances, and parties to the litigation.'
Finally,
appellate review should only determine whether the district court abused its
discretion, not whether the appellate court would have reached the same
conclusion as the district court." °
In Rufo, the Supreme Court adopted a flexible consent decree modification test that was overly indulgent of governmental institutions. The Court
too frequently grants undue deference to the government and its powerful
institutions. Apparently, it is easier for the Court to rule against the "little
guy" than defy the strong arm of the government. Granting deference to
governmental institutions renders them virtually autonomous. This autonomy has all too often allowed institutions to abuse their discretion, which is
exactly why Rufo's original inmate-petitioners lived in deplorable conditions
and were forced to sue to have their rights acknowledged.

tural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725, 757-60 (elaborating on what is inequitable
under Rule 60(b)(5)); Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (1986) (discussing requirements of
Rule 60(b)(5) for modification of decree).
107. See Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 301 (refusing to modify single-cell provision as it
was important element of decree's remedy); Carey, 706 F.2d at 969 (arguing that when modifying decree's central provision, strict standard should be used to prevent elimination of decree
goals); Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 565 (denying modification as it would destroy consent decree's
central purpose); see also Note, The Modification of Consent Decrees in Institutional Reform
Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1020, 1024-25 (1986) (arguing that modification should be used
only to "fine-tune" consent decrees); Martin A. Schwartz, Modification of Consent Decrees,
N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1992, at 3 (warning that modification should not rewrite decree).
108. See, e.g., Hutto, 437 U.S. at 688 (recognizing that trial judges have years of experience with problems at hand and deserve deference); Twelve John Does, 861 F.2d at 300-01
(concluding that district court judge who supervised decree for considerable length of time
deserves special deference in deciding modification issues); Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 860 (stating that
modification decisions properly rest with district court judges); see also Lloyd C. Anderson,
Implementation of Consent Decrees in StructuralReform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725,
755 (1986) (discussing district court's power to modify consent decrees); Martin A. Schwartz,
Modification of InstitutionalReform Decrees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 17, 1992, at 3 (noting heightened
deference should be given to district court judges who have previously overseen institution).
109. Rufo, - U.S. at -, 112 S.Ct. at 765, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 892 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Under this proposed flexible standard, the movants in Rufo clearly would not have been
granted modification as they had an extremely poor compliance history, the modification went
to the heart of the decree's central purpose, the decree was not shown to the unworkable, the
problems were foreseen, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying modification. See id. at -.
, 112 S. Ct. at 768-73, 116 L. Ed. 2d at 896-902 (delineating reasons why
movants' request for modification should have been denied) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This test
would also help to preserve interest in consent decrees as a reliable form of settlement, unlike
the majority test which discourages settlement. Id. at -_,
112 S. Ct. at 772, 116 L. Ed. 2d at
901 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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The persons served by governmental institutions-the disabled, the poor,
the victims of discrimination, and the incarcerated-are generally weak.
For protection, these citizens turn to their government. However, Rufo illustrates that frequently it is that very government which has caused the
harm. As a last resort, these victims look to the judicial system for assistance, only to discover that the courts defer to the government and its institutions which are the source of the evil. Consequently, these victims are
trapped in a vicious cycle from which there appears no escape. Unless the
Supreme Court and the entire judicial system abandon the deferential standard, this cycle is inevitable. When the government fails, the courts have no
alternative but to take a more active role in formulating appropriate relief.
The late Robert F. Kennedy encouraged such activism when he noted that:
[e]very time we turn our heads the other way when we see the law
flouted -

when we tolerate what we know to be wrong -

when we

close our eyes and our ears to the corrupt because we are.., too frightened -

when we fail to speak up and speak out -

we strike a blow

against freedom and decency and justice."o
Christy J. Lindsay

110. SUZY

PLATT, RESPECTFULLY QUOTED

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol24/iss2/12

28 (Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1992).

20

